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THE NEW HECKLER’S VETO:   
SHOUTING DOWN SPEECH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES 
Charles S. Nary* 
INTRODUCTION 
We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign 
ideas, alien philosophies, and competitive values.  For a nation that is afraid to let 
its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid 
of its people. 
—John F. Kennedy1 
In March of 2017, Dr. Charles Murray was invited by a conservative 
student group to speak at Middlebury College.2  The group invited campus 
members to come to the event and debate his viewpoints.  In his introduction 
to Murray’s speech, a representative from the hosting organization implored 
his fellow students to debate Murray rather than shouting him down.3  This 
request was not followed and, as Murray approached the podium, dozens of 
students in the audience turned their backs and began chanting “Hey, hey 
ho ho, Charles Murray has got to go,” “Your message is hatred, we cannot 
tolerate it,” “Charles Murray go away, Middlebury says no way,” and “Shut 
it down.”4  Murray was forced to leave the event early and was chased off 
campus by protestors.5  Even though Middlebury administration took 
extraordinary measures to ensure that Murray could speak, the event was 
unsuccessful.6 
 
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 21.  University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 2019; Rutgers University, B.A., 2016.  Thank you to Professor Seth 
F. Kreimer and my friend Louis Capozzi for their guidance and feedback on earlier versions of this 
Comment.  I would like to also thank the Editors of Volume 20 for their mentorship and the Editors 
of Volume 21 for their hard work in supporting the Journal.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents 
who, without them, I would not be where I am today.  
1 Remarks on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Voice of America (Feb. 26, 1962).  
2 Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebury-free-speech-
violence/518667/.  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 For an overview of the events leading up to the shout down, see Taylor Gee, How the Middlebury Riot 
Really Went Down, POLITICO (May 28, 2017), https://www.politico.com/ 
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The 2016–17 academic year has been called by some the “year of the 
shout-down;”7 a year in which objectionable college campus speakers are 
“shut down” by protestors shouting over them instead of allowing them to 
express their views and then debate them.8  The 2017–18 school year seemed 
to be even worse than the previous, based on the current rates of “shout-
downs.”9  Within these crises are two free speech interests coming to a 
clash—those of the speaker and those of the protestors.  These conflicts 
continue to persist, as many universities are doing little to protect speakers 
and those who wish to engage in the discussion.  This type of conduct will 
continue unless universities take steps to help protect the free speech interests 
of speakers by ensuring that unruly protestors, whose goal is to disrupt the 
speech, are unable to stop the discussion by excluding them from the room.10 
This Comment advocates an original position for how universities should 
deal with this problem, while taking into consideration the existing 
constitutional framework.  There is not much existing scholarship on this 
specific topic of what I am terming the “New Heckler’s Veto,” an updated 
and modified version of the term coined by Professor Harry Kalven.11  Under 
the New Heckler’s Veto, the heckler uses the volume of his voice, rather than 
a threat of violence, to shut down speakers who he disagrees with.  Free speech 
 
magazine/story/2017/05/28/how-donald-trump-caused-the-middlebury-melee-215195. 
 7 Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was Worse than You Think, NAT’L REV.: THE CORNER (May 
31, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/blog/corner/year-shout-down-worse-you-
think-campus-free-speech/. 
 8 For an excellent overview of how colleges dealt with other free speech challenges in 2017 that are 
not discussed in this Comment, see Catherine J. Ross, Campus Discourse and Democracy: Free Speech 
Principles Provide Sound Guidance Even After the Tumult of 2017, 20 U. PA. J. CON. L. 787 (2018). 
 9 See Stanley Kurtz, Campus Shout-Down Rate Nearly Quadruples, NAT’L REVIEW: THE CORNER (Nov. 
2, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/blog/corner/campus-shout-down-rate-
quadruples-free-speech/ (“[A]s we approach the halfway mark of the Fall 2017 semester, the rate 
of shout-downs is now nearly quadruple that of last spring.”).  For purposes of this Comment, a 
“shout-down” occurs when a protesting group causes a speaker to cancel his speech because he is 
unable to talk over the volume of the protestors’ chanting. 
 10 Although this Comment only examines shout-downs in the United States, this is not a problem 
unique to the United States.  See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, ‘Hijacking a Fundamental Right,’ INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Mar. 21 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/21/shouting-
down-controversial-speaker-mcmaster-raises-new-concerns-about-academic (discussing a shout-
down taking place at a Canadian university).  Nor is it a problem that has emerged as a response 
to the 2016 presidential election.  See, e.g., Abby Ohlheiser, Ray Kelly was Booed off the Stage at Brown 
University, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
10/ray-kelly-gets-booed-stage-brown-university/354606/ (reporting that Brown University 
canceled a lecture from then New York City Police Department Commissioner Ray Kelly after 
thirty minutes of shouting and protest from the audience). 
 11 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1965) (“If the police can 
silence the speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being 
hostile enough, get the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”). 
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on campus has been and continues to be a hot-button issue, particularly 
within the legal community.  The goal of this Comment is to examine how 
this problem can be combatted by universities and event organizers.12 
First Amendment cases have shown speech rights are not absolute and 
that context matters.  A classic example of this proposition is that the “most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” 13  Because the First 
Amendment is not an absolute prohibition on the regulation of speech, there 
should be restrictions on shouting during a speaker’s event on a college 
campus.  Although a protest chant may be considered protected speech, it 
should not be protected by universities when it is used in an academic setting 
as a means of shutting down discussion because it stifles the very thing the 
First Amendment is designed to protect.  In this academic context, new 
policies that impose time, place, and manner restrictions on the speech rights 
of protestors are necessary to protect the rights of speakers and attendees.  
While there have been instances where threats of violence have caused 
speakers to cancel their events, this Comment does not focus on those.  
Instead, it focuses on a new form of a “heckler’s veto” by which events can 
be shut down by shouting and being louder than the speaker.   
First, this Comment will define the “New Heckler’s Veto” by comparing 
it with what is legally termed the “heckler’s veto.”  Second, it will look at 
current attitudes of college students towards the New Heckler’s Veto and 
examine examples of it in action.  Third, this Comment will examine the 
importance of discussion to free speech and American society.  Fourth, it will 
survey the First Amendment legal framework and look at an application of 
the law to analogous situations.  Fifth, this Comment will outline and discuss 
my six-step proposal for how colleges can defeat the New Heckler’s Veto.   
I.  DEFINING THE NEW HECKLER’S VETO 
The traditional heckler’s veto was established in Feiner v. New York.14  In 
that case, a man was giving a speech on a corner and “gave the impression 
that he was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the whites, 
urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.”15  The statements 
that he made “stirred up a little excitement” in the mixed-race crowd and 
 
 12 Issues regarding extending or retracting university speaking invitations are separate issues and will 
not be discussed in this Comment. 
 13 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 14 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
 15 Id. at 316–17. 
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“at least one [onlooker] threatened violence if the police did not act” to stop 
the speech.16  The speaker, and not the heckler, was arrested and the 
Supreme Court upheld his conviction, holding that the conviction was not a 
violation of the First Amendment.17  The Court justified its decision by 
stating that Feiner was “neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the 
content of his speech.  Rather, it was the reaction which it actually 
engendered.”18  The Court affirmed the conviction because of the objections 
of the crowd, and not because of the language of the speech itself.  Although 
the Court upheld the conviction, the Court noted that “the ordinary 
murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence 
a speaker.”19  By upholding the conviction, the Court implied that it was 
permissible for crowds to prevent speakers from speaking if they threatened 
to react violently towards them.  This effectively gave the protestors a veto 
on the content of the speech, as they, with the support of the government, 
had the ability to object to certain speeches and not others.   
The New Heckler’s Veto is distinguishable from the heckler’s veto 
established in Feiner on four distinct grounds.  First, there is a difference in 
the actors who are providing the censorship.  In Feiner, the censor was the 
police, acting on behalf of the government; while in the New Heckler’s Veto 
the censors are private citizens who wish to censor the speech of others.20  
Second, there is a difference in what is being feared by the censors.  In Feiner, 
the government feared violence resulting from the speech; while in the New 
Heckler’s Veto, the hecklers fear the speech itself. 21  Third, there is a 
difference in the method of how the heckler is able to shut down the speech.  
In Feiner, a heckler threatened violence to stop the speech.  In the New 
Heckler’s Veto, the hecklers shout over the speaker until he can no longer be 
heard or gives up.  Fourth, there is a difference in location of where the 
speech is taking place.  In Feiner, the speech was given on a street corner; 
while the New Heckler’s Veto is used to primarily shut down speeches on 
university campuses. 
 
 16 Id. at 317. 
 17 Id. at 318, 321. 
 18 Id. at 319–20. 
 19 Id. at 320. 
 20 In effect, the actors in both scenarios might actually be the government.  Universities that allow 
events to be shut down by giving in to the demands of the protestors are similar to the police giving 
into the demands of the heckler in Feiner.  However, there are many differences between universities 
and police, such as the authorization to use force, that make the actors distinguishable in their 
control over the speakers and protestors. 
 21 Universities may cancel events due to the fear of violence breaking out.  However, violence in the 
examples given did not seem as imminent or as likely as the scenario in Feiner.  Real threats of 
violence bring in additional considerations that are not the subject of this Comment. 
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These distinctions make it difficult for courts to apply precedent to cases 
involving the New Heckler’s Veto.  The four distinctions raise new concerns, 
particularly because there are two competing private free speech interests.  
The government is therefore placed in a difficult position of having to choose 
which rights deserve protection.  The government may choose not to get 
involved at all.  The common ground between the New Heckler’s Veto and 
the one in Feiner is the most important takeaway: the end of both results in 
the silencing of the speaker’s message.  The New Heckler’s Veto can be 
criticized on similar grounds that the one in Feiner was criticized for.  
Justice Black’s dissent in Feiner, while addressing government censorship 
action, is instructive in pointing out the problems of allowing private citizens 
to hold veto power over speeches.  Justice Black begins by stating that 
upholding the conviction “makes a mockery of the free speech guarantees of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and that the “end result of the 
affirmance here is to approve a simple and readily available technique by 
which cities and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or 
otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and censorship of the 
local police.”22  Justice Black emphasized that the police did not do “[t]heir 
duty . . . to protect [the speaker’s] right to talk” through “available 
alternative methods of preserving public order.”23  Justice Black concluded 
that “today’s holding means that as a practical matter, minority speakers can 
be silenced in any city.”24  
The Court recognized the problems of endorsing the heckler’s veto 
within a couple of decades of Feiner and began condemning its use.  During 
the 1960s, the heckler’s veto was being used as a tool to prevent advances 
during the Civil Rights Movement, when black protestors were frequently 
arrested for peacefully occupying segregated areas because their acts 
unnerved and unsettled onlookers.  The Court addressed this practice in 
Brown v. Louisiana, ruling that the demonstrators’ First Amendment rights 
may not be curtailed merely because “their critics might react with disorder 
or violence.”25  The Court recognized that the heckler’s veto was a tool that 
could be used by a majority to suppress the views and rights of minority 
 
 22 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 323 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 23 Id. at 327, 327 n.9; see also Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1994) (“First Amendment 
rights are not subject to the heckler’s veto.  The rioters are the culpable parties, not the artist whose 
work unintentionally provoked them to violence.” (internal citation omitted) (citing Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965)). 
 24 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 25 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (“Participants in an orderly demonstration in a 
public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the constitutionally 
protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder or violence.”). 
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groups and explicitly rejected it.26  The Court—as a further rejection of 
content specific prohibitions of speech—also (and thereafter) recognized that 
punishing the use of certain words was itself a violation of the First 
Amendment because “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”27   
After rejecting Feiner, the Supreme Court came to treat restraints 
responding to audience hostility as “content” or “viewpoint” discrimination.  
In both Forsyth County and Reno, the Court struck down restrictions that 
impermissibly controlled or banned speech that was seen as “offensive” to at 
least part of the population.28  These rejections of content discriminatory laws 
showed that suppressing offensive speech in an effort to pander to those who 
are offended by it is per se improper.29  Offensiveness has been recognized 
as a feature, rather than a detraction, when it comes to free speech, as the 
Supreme Court has stated “time and again that ‘the public expression of 
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves 
offensive to some of their hearers’”30 because “[i]f there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.”31  Though the Court has held the heckler’s veto to be 
 
 26 See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1969) (“This is a simple case.  Petitioners, 
accompanied by Chicago police and an assistant city attorney, marched in a peaceful and orderly 
procession from city hall to the mayor’s residence to press their claims for desegregation of the 
public schools.  Having promised to cease singing at 8:30 p.m., the marchers did so.  Although 
petitioners and the other demonstrators continued to march in a completely lawful fashion, the 
onlookers became unruly as the number of bystanders increased.  Chicago police, to prevent what 
they regarded as an impending civil disorder, demanded that the demonstrators, upon pain of 
arrest, disperse.  When this command was not obeyed, petitioners were arrested for disorderly 
conduct.  Petitioners’ march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
 27 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); see also id. at 25–26 (noting that “governments might 
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression 
of unpopular views.”). 
 28 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (“[T]he purpose of the 
[Communications Decency Act] is to protect children from the primary effects of ‘indecent’ and 
‘patently offensive’ speech, rather than any ‘secondary’ effect of such speech.  Thus, the CDA is a 
content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be ‘properly analyzed as a form 
of time, place, and manner regulation.’” (citation omitted) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986)); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 
(1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”). 
 29 There are two types of government responses to the heckler’s veto—reacting to situations of hostility 
or preempting situations of hostility through the enactment of a law.  The latter is far more invidious 
and thus ought to be treated differently because it acts as a form of prior restraint, which has long 
been recognized as being incompatible with the First Amendment.  See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 273–77 (1964) (providing an overview and criticism of the Alien and Sedition Acts). 
 30 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
 31 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also id. at 408–09 (1989) (“[A] principal function of 
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unconstitutional as a content-specific restriction on speech, its spirit lives on 
today in a different form and is being used as a tool to suppress unpopular 
views on university campuses.32 
II.  EXISTING STATE OF PLAY ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
There is a free speech crisis on university campuses33 and current statistics 
show the negative attitudes Americans and students have towards free speech 
on university campuses.  Approximately fifty-one percent of college students 
believe that it is acceptable for a student group to “disrupt[ ] a speech by 
loudly and repeatedly shouting so that the audience cannot hear the 
[controversial] speaker.”34  Additionally, approximately nineteen percent of 
college students believe that it is acceptable to use violence to disrupt a 
speaker who is saying “offensive and hurtful” things on campus.35  Nearly 
two-thirds (sixty-one percent) of Americans believe that “people often call 
others racist or sexist to avoid having to debate with them.” 36  More than 
three-fourths (seventy-six percent) of Americans say that recent campus 
 
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best serve its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or 
even stirs people to anger.  It would be odd indeed to conclude both that ‘if it is the speaker’s opinion 
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection,’ and that 
the government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported 
presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence.” (citations omitted)). 
 32 See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Disruption Violate Free Speech?, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Does-Disruption-Violate-Free/241470 
(“Contrary to the view of these protesters, individuals do not have a right to prevent others from 
speaking.  It has long been recognized in constitutional law that the ‘heckler’s veto’—defined as the 
suppression of speech in order to appease disruptive, hostile, or threatening members of the 
audience—can be as much a threat to rights of free expression as government censorship.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,  Lighting A FIRE on College Campuses: An Inside Perspective 
on Free Speech, Public Policy & Higher Education, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 206 (2005) (“Battles 
are being waged on campuses across the United States.”); Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Address 
at the Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 26, 2017), transcript available at http://time.com/ 
4957604/jeff-sessions-georgetown-law-speech-transcript/ (“The American university was once the 
center of academic freedom—a place of robust debate, a forum for the competition of ideas.  But 
it is transforming into an echo chamber of political correctness and homogenous thought, a shelter 
for fragile egos.”).  
 34 John Villasenor, Views Among College Students Regarding the First Amendment: Results From a New Survey, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/views-
among-college-students-regarding-the-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/.  For criticism 
of this survey and its methodology, see Lois Beckett, ‘Junk Science’: Experts Cast Doubt on Widely Cited 
College Free Speech Survey, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/sep/22/college-free-speech-violence-survey-junk-science. 
 35 Villasenor, supra note 34. 
 36 Emily Ekins, The State of Free Speech and Tolerance in America, CATO INST. (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/state-free-speech-tolerance-america. 
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protests and cancellations of controversial speakers are part of a “broader 
pattern” of how college students deal with offensive ideas.37  Two-thirds 
(sixty-six percent) of Americans say colleges and universities aren’t doing 
enough to teach young Americans today about the value of free speech.38  
These numbers and attitudes are not surprising, as they are reflective of the 
recent actions taken by many students. 
There are numerous examples of speakers being shut down on campuses, 
but this Comment highlights a select few that occurred in 2016–17.  While it 
appears to be primarily a tool to shut down conservative-leaning speakers, 
like Charles Murray, the New Heckler’s Veto has also been invoked to shut 
down events featuring more liberal speakers as well.  In October of 2017, 
students at William and Mary hosted an ACLU event titled “Students and 
the First Amendment.”39  After starting the event, protestors from the Black 
Lives Matter movement streamed into the auditorium.40  The speaker stated 
“I’m going to talk to you about knowing your rights, and protests and 
demonstrations, which this illustrates very well.  Then I’m going to respond 
to questions from the moderators, and then questions from the audience.”41  
Those were the last words she was able to speak, as the protestors chanted 
and drowned out all hope of a meaningful discussion.  “Liberalism is white 
supremacy” and “Shame!  Shame!  Shame!” they chanted, and organizers 
were forced to cancel the event.42  This incident suggests that protestors will 
silence anyone who does not fully agree with their own views.43 
Even schools with strong policies that are meant to protect against the 
New Heckler’s Veto can fall victim to it.  In April 2016, the University of 
Pennsylvania hosted then-CIA Director John Brennan and less than 15 
minutes after he was introduced, protestors interrupted the event, chanting 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Emily Zanotti, Black Lives Matter Shuts Down Campus ACLU Event Because ‘Liberalism is White Supremacy,’ 
DAILY WIRE (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.dailywire.com/news/21985/black-lives-matter-shuts-
down-campus-aclu-event-emily-zanotti. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 While the cause and motivations are not examined in this comment, the New Heckler’s Veto seems 
to have a prevalent role in our political lives.  For example, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
was shouted down by Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) beneficiaries while at a 
news conference for working with President Donald Trump on DACA.  Sarah D. Wire, Nancy Pelosi 
Shouted Down at DACA News Conference for Working with Trump, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017, 12:12 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-nancy-pelosi-
shouted-down-at-daca-press-1505760392-htmlstory.html.  She attempted to calm the crowd down 
and talk to them, but after being unable to do so, she left after half an hour and stated, “We need 
to have a conversation, but that was completely one sided; they don’t want any answers.”  Id.  
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“drones kill kids” and “U.S. out of the Middle East.”44  After the chanting 
started, University of Pennsylvania Law School’s Dean Theodore Ruger 
returned to the stage to explain Penn’s freedom of expression policy and 
asked the protestors “Are you trying to silence him?”45  However, his voice 
was quickly drowned out as protesters continued to yell over him.  Some 
protestors were escorted out of the room, but the moderators were unable to 
regain control of the room.46  After the third interruption, the moderators 
decided to end the event.47  The protestors were organized by the Students 
for a Democratic Society, who handed out flyers outside the event, reading:  
“This event is being disrupted because John Brennan is the head of the most 
destructive terrorist organization in the world today, the CIA.”48  A member 
of the group responded to the accusation that the protesters were silencing 
speech, saying, “I don’t think there’s any reason to allow speech that supports 
apartheid, that supports literal genocide. . . .”49 
The New Heckler’s Veto is not being used exclusively by university 
students, as there are instances where non-students are using it as a tool of 
their own.  In October 2017 at Whittier College in California, Pro-Trump 
protestors shut down an event featuring California Attorney General Xavier 
Becerra and California State Assembly Leader Ian Calderon.50  These 
disruptors chanted slogans and insults like: “build that wall,” “lock him up,” 
“respect our president,” and “Americans first.”  One of the speakers asked 
the audience to hold applause or booing, remarking “It’s important that we 
have a productive conversation here.”51  The event, scheduled for an hour, 
concluded after about thirty-four minutes.52  The disruptors later boasted 
that they were able to shut the event down.53 
These are just a few illustrative examples of university campus events 
 
 44 Ally Johnson, Protests Shut Down CIA Director’s Talk at Penn, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Apr. 1, 2016, 
10:25 PM), http://www.thedp.com/article/2016/04/protests-shut-down-cia-director-john-
brennan-talk. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Adam Steinbaugh, Hecklers Shout Down California Attorney General, Assembly Majority Leader at Whittier 
College, FIRE (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/hecklers-shout-down-california-attorney-
general-assembly-majority-leader-at-whittier-college/. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.; see also id. (noting that the protestors “weren’t interested in an exchange of views” and instead 
“engaged in a ‘heckler’s veto’—a form of censorship FIRE emphatically condemns”). 
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being shut down by protestors.54  Although there are many campus speakers 
who are able to speak uninterrupted, it is important to note that these actions 
in a few colleges can have a ripple effect and spread to other colleges and 
environments.55  The way these few examples are highlighted by the media 
helps to quickly spread two opposing ideas—the idea that free speech is 
under attack and the idea that students and others can get away with shutting 
down ideas that they find to be offensive.  This problem needs to be fixed, 
but before a solution is proposed and analyzed, it is first important to 
recognize the importance of free speech, especially its role in higher 
education. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCUSSION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND 
FREE SPEECH  
The First Amendment provides a constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech, stating that, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”56  Numerous Supreme Court cases have interpreted the 
amendment and its purpose.  The prevailing view was stated in Justices 
Brandeis and Holmes’s concurrence in Whitney v. California.  As to the purpose 
of the First Amendment, they stated, 
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government. . . . they knew . . . that it is hazardous to discourage thought, 
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds 
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; 
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  Believing in the 
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence 
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.57 
 
 54 For more examples of the New Heckler’s Veto, see Kurtz, supra note 9.  
 55 See generally Sessions, supra note 33 (stating that Americans should be concerned with a “permissive 
attitude toward the heckler’s veto” because “Protestors are now routinely shutting down speeches and 
debates across the country in an effort to silence voices that insufficiently conform with their views.”)  
 56 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment was incorporated to apply to the States, through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 57 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
Justice Brandeis’s view was adopted by the majority in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).   
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The Justices had a problem with coerced silence, further stating that, “If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”58  It is difficult to have offensiveness be the 
criterion for suppression because “Every idea is an incitement.”59  When 
society attempts to regulate unpopular opinions, “we should be eternally 
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe,” 
and that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.”60  The case law therefore makes 
it clear that one of the purposes of the First Amendment is to promote 
discussion, and what better place to engage in reasoned discussion than on 
the university campus.61 
Universities are regarded as the epicenters of thought and discussion—
places where theories and ideas are tested and debated.  They are places 
where young bright minds go to learn and become the leaders and thinkers 
of tomorrow.  Universities are the places where students pursue the truth.  
But why is discussion, and not just the promotion of ideas themselves, 
important to the pursuit of truth?  It is because the nature of discussion helps 
to promote the pursuit of truth, as truth is not something that can be imposed 
on society. 62  In a chapter of On Liberty,63 John Stuart Mill discusses how 
important it is to everyone to allow the free exchange of ideas.  He begins by 
examining the harms that come with silencing opinions that are not generally 
accepted by society, stating that “[i]f all mankind minus one were of one 
opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would 
be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, 
would be justified in silencing mankind.”64  As for the harm itself, he states 
 
 58 Whitney, 247 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 59 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 60 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 61 For a greater overview of the evolution of our First Amendment doctrine, see Zachary S. Price, Our 
Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CON. L. 817 (2018). 
 62 The university is fundamentally important to democracy and the evolution of society, and free and 
open discussion is a necessary piece of the university.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (“The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this 
day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and attainment.  For the University, by 
regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free 
speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college 
and university campuses.”).  The overburdening of speech at the university can lead to a “chilling 
of individual thought and expression” which can be harmful to our “tradition of thought and 
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”  Id. at 835. 
 63 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Batoche Books Ltd. 2001) (1859). 
 64 Id. at 18. 
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that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those 
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.”65  There is 
therefore value in having dissenting opinions heard by people in an open 
forum where the opinions can be debated and discussed. 
An opinion that is being silenced can either be correct or false, but that 
does not justify suppression of that opinion.  “If the opinion is right, they are 
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, 
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”66  Protestors often 
justify their actions by stating that they are suppressing opinions that are 
wrong, but “[w]e can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to 
stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”67  
It would still be an evil to silence wrong opinions because society can still 
benefit by hearing the strongest arguments for that side and then have an 
advocate dispel those arguments.  It must be up to an individual, and not an 
angry mob, to judge that opinion and assess its truth value because the mob 
has “no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every 
other person from the means of judging.”68  Protestors do not have to worry 
about the spreading of an opinion if it is truly false because it will eventually 
yield to fact and argument.  But there first needs to be open discussion in 
order to bring the arguments and facts to light, as “[v]ery few facts are able 
to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning.”69  
Discussion is particularly important in universities because it is a 
necessary part of learning.  Experience alone is not enough to provide 
support for one’s beliefs and “[t]here must be discussion, to show how 
experience is to be interpreted.”70  Discussion is necessary because the only 
way we “can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by 
hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and 
studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind.”71  
It is through the very nature of open debate and discussion that provide the 
strongest support for holding certain beliefs because the “beliefs which we 
have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation 
 
 65 Id. at 19. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 21. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 22. 
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to the whole world to prove them unfounded.”72  We are not born into the 
world with omnipotence to know the truth, and must discuss and debate 
ideas in order to discover the truth.  
Protestors who wish to stifle discussion miss out on some of the benefits 
that it can have for them.  Discussion is important to the protestor who 
believes that his views and positions are the right ones and is unwilling to 
provide a platform for the opponent to express his views.  The protestor must 
engage in discussion with the other side in order to be fully exposed to it, 
because “[h]e who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.”73  
Although his reasoning may be sound and irrefutable, “if he is equally unable 
to refute the reasons on the opposite side . . . he has no ground for preferring 
either opinion.”74  He must hear them from the other side and not from his 
own teachers, who often provide their own view on how they are stated and 
how to refute them because that “is not the way to do justice to the 
arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind.”75  He must 
hear arguments from people who actually believe in the ideas, stated in “their 
most plausible and persuasive form” so that he will face difficulty in 
defending the true view.76  Oftentimes these protestors who wish to shut 
down speakers they disagree with “have never thrown themselves into the 
mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered 
what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any 
proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves 
profess.”77  A common justification for why protestors wish to shut down 
certain speakers is because they believe that the speaker’s views are not useful 
to society and may instead be harmful.  But the “usefulness of an opinion is 
itself matter of opinion,” which makes it “as disputable, as open to discussion, 
and requiring discussion as much as the opinion itself.”78  Although hate 
speech can have a silencing effect on the speech of certain groups, usually 
minorities,79 and thus harming democracy itself, permitting groups to 
regulate hateful speech allows them to effectively regulate too much speech, 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 35. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 36. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 23.  This draws parallels with the scientific method, under which theories become generally 
accepted if there is an opportunity for others to attempt to prove them false. 
 79 See Solveig Horne, Hate Speech — A Threat to Freedom of Speech, HUFFPOST (Mar. 8, 2017, 4:05 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/solveig-horne/hate-speech--a-threat-to_b_9406596.html  
(arguing that “[h]ate speech may cause fear and can be the reason why people withdraw from the 
public debate.”). 
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since hate speech is often difficult to define.80   
Without discussion, it is impossible to discover truth.  Truth is not as 
simple as we might think, especially on subjects in which difference of 
opinion is possible, because “the truth depends on a balance to be struck 
between two sets of conflicting reasons.”81  Though we may wish to perceive 
an opinion as wholly true or wholly false, it is more likely the case that there 
are a variety of opinions, each of which contains some truth.  In order to fully 
understand the truth, “the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the 
remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a 
part.”82  Without hearing from the other side, we cannot recognize mistakes 
in our thinking caused by our own biases.  If we are serious about pursuing 
the truth in the “marketplace of ideas,” “every opinion which embodies 
somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to 
be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that 
truth may be blended.”83  The best way to protect each opinion, to ensure 
that the truth value is not lost, is to subject them to discussion and debate as 
“a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.”84  Even for 
matters that we might think are settled, society can still benefit from 
discussion and debate on the subject.  Particularly relevant in the context of 
the New Heckler’s Veto, Mill writes that when there are people “who form 
an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if 
the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something 
worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by 
their silence.”85  Silence is a problem for society because “there is always 
hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend 
only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have 
the effect of truth.”86  Without an advocate on each side and an audience to 
listen, there is no hope that the truth will be discovered. 
Both the case law and philosophical works that were influential to our 
founding show that discussion is essential to a well-functioning society.  
 
 80 See, e.g., David Rutz, Sasse Asks Zuckerberg to Define ‘Hate Speech,’ WASH. FREE BEACON (Apr. 10, 2018, 
9:33 PM), https://freebeacon.com/politics/sasse-asks-zuckerberg-to-define-hate-speech/ (noting 
that when Senator Ben Sasse asked Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to define “hate speech,” 
Zuckerberg replied, “I think that this is a really hard question.  And I think it’s one of the reasons 
why we struggle with [defining] it.”). 
 81 MILL, supra note 63, at 35. 
 82 Id. at 44. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 45. 
 85 Id. at 46. 
 86 Id. at 49. 
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Society must permit the free discussion of ideas, even when most people view 
some opinions to be wrong or harmful to society.  Universities play a special 
role in the realm of free speech because they are places where ideas are 
supposed to be tried and tested, exposed to young minds, and discussed.87  
College protestors that use the New Heckler’s Veto need to understand the 
importance of open and free discussion on their campuses.88  Until protestors 
are willing to accept the rights of others to speak freely on campus, 
restrictions need to be imposed on them. 
IV.  COMBATTING THE NEW HECKLER’S VETO WITH TIME, PLACE, AND 
MANNER RESTRICTIONS 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of balancing the 
First Amendment interests of invited campus speakers with the First 
Amendment interests of protestors.  Since public forums often exist within 
public universities,89 it would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination 
 
 87 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long recognized that, given the 
important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition.”).  
 88 The New Heckler’s Veto is less of a problem at law schools, places where there is no shortage of 
controversial speakers.  See Heather Gerken, One Campus Arena Where Free Speech is Not up for Debate: 
Law Schools, TIME, July 24, 2017, at 20 (noting that law schools “have been largely exempt from 
ugly free-speech incidents” like those on undergraduate campuses).  But see Scott Jaschik, Shouting 
Down Talk on Campus Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/16/guest-lecture-free-speech-cuny-law-school-
heckled (reporting that students at CUNY Law School attempted to chant over a speaker); Scott 
Jaschik, Speech, Interrupted, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2018/03/06/students-interrupt-several-portions-speech-christina-hoff-sommers (reporting 
the same at Lewis & Clark Law School).  Law students are taught the exact values of free speech as 
Mill advocates for.  They are taught to defend arguments that they may not necessarily agree with 
and see the world as their opponents do.  Gerken, supra.  Even the litigation system is premised on 
the idea that the truth will emerge if there are advocates on each side of a case advocating for their 
views.  Id.  Once the immediate threats of the New Heckler’s Veto are dealt with, it may be time to 
turn to see how these values that law students learn can be transmitted to the undergraduate 
universities.  Of course, implementing these values as soon as possible may be another way to solve 
the problem. 
 89 The First Amendment applies to only public universities because they are acting under the authority 
of the state government.  See Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech 
Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249, 1250 (1995) (“Administrators on state 
campuses are state actors and thus are subject to the negative directive of the First Amendment that 
government ‘shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’” (footnotes omitted)).  Private 
universities are able to place restrictions on speech without having to abide by the First Amendment 
doctrine.  See Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive 
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1381 (1990) (“[T]he very nature of a private 
university’s charter and organization allows it to promulgate regulations that need not comply with 
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to exclude protestors from certain events simply because they disagree with 
the speaker.90  However, this does not mean that protestors cannot ever be 
excluded from events.  Restrictions on speech that are viewpoint neutral and 
subject-matter neutral may permissibly regulate the time, place, or manner 
of expression if they (1) are content neutral; (2) are narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant government interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.91  A regulation is deemed content neutral if it 
serves purposes unrelated to the content of speech, regardless of whether it 
incidentally affects certain speakers or messages and not others.92  Narrow 
tailoring is achieved when the regulation “promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.”93  An adequate, alternative avenue for the expression of 
protected speech exists even if the location where that expression must take 
place is fixed in relation to the forum.94  
The Supreme Court has recognized a potential conflict between the free 
speech rights of two different groups.  It has noted that, 
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic 
society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express 
may address a group at any public place and at any time.  The constitutional 
guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society 
maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the 
excesses of anarchy.95 
Without restrictions on speech, it is impossible to engage in discussion.  
Universities, as epicenters of thought and discussion, must embrace and 
enforce content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions over protestors.  
Even though the Court has noted that “the right of free speech . . . does not 
 
the first amendment.”). 
 90 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 91 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  Time, place, and manner restrictions 
inherently involve suppressions of speech.  If they did not, the government would not have an 
effective means of advancing many of its interests.  For example, a town can enact a law that 
regulates the size of signs or the location in which the signs may be placed, but it cannot prohibit 
signs with particular messages on them.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (listing examples of sign legislation that would be permissible under the First 
Amendment in order to protect public safety and aesthetic objectives).  
 92 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; cf. Reed, at 2227 (2015) (“Government regulation of speech is content based 
if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed.”). 
 93 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). 
 94 See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643, 655 (1981) (upholding 
a rule that confined sale and distribution of all materials at a fair to a fixed area of the fairground 
as a rule that provided the groups with “adequate means to sell and solicit on the fairgrounds”). 
 95 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others,” there is little 
protection of these free speech rights without an enforcement mechanism.96  
Both speakers and protestors have important viewpoints that they wish to 
convey, but neither can do so without order being imposed on university 
campuses. 
Clashing viewpoints are not unique to university campuses.  An 
illustrative example of how competing interests were resolved was Startzell v. 
City of Philadelphia.97  In the case, a group known as Repent America believed 
that homosexuality was sinful and wanted to end OutFest, an event 
organized by Philly Pride that celebrated “National Coming Out Day.”98  
They showed up to the event and brought bullhorns, large signs, and 
literature to distribute.99  The group began to convey their message close to 
the main stage, singing loudly, playing instruments, displaying large signs, 
and using microphones and bullhorns.100  The police asked the group to 
move farther away from the main stage, but Repent America refused to do 
so and instead marched closer to the main stage area.101  The police then 
arrested the group’s members for disorderly conduct.102 
The court was then faced with the task of balancing the free speech 
interests of the organizers of OutFest and those of Repent America.  It 
recognized that Repent America “posess[es] a First Amendment right to 
communicate [its] message in a public forum” but also that “[its] rights are 
not superior to the First Amendment rights of Philly Pride, as permit-holder, 
to effectively convey the message of its event.”103  Particularly of note was 
when the court noted that the “right of free speech does not encompass the 
right to cause disruption” and that the city’s interest in protecting the rights 
of a permit-holder “necessarily includes the right of police officers to prevent 
counter-protestors from disrupting or interfering with the message of the 
permit-holder.”104  The Court found that “when protestors move from 
distributing literature and wearing signs to disruption of the permitted 
activities, the existence of a permit tilts the balance in favor of the permit-
holders.”105  The Court held that the police’s order directing Repent America 
 
 96 Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). 
 97 533 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 98 Id. at 188–89. 
 99 Id. at 190. 
 100 Id. at 190–91. 
 101 Id. at 191. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. at 198. 
 104 Id. at 198–99. 
 105 Id. at 199. 
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“to move to another location within OutFest” was content-neutral and not 
unconstitutional because “they were merely imposing a content-neutral time, 
place, or manner restriction” on the group’s actions.106  The court next held 
that “[t]he City’s actions in this case were narrowly tailored to serve its 
significant interests” in ensuring that “OutFest’s permit to engage in its 
speech activities is respected.”107  Lastly, the court found that Repent 
America “had alternative ways to express themselves without causing 
disruption, such as through the use of smaller signs without bullhorns so that 
the performances on the stages would not be obscured.”108 
It is worthwhile to speculate what might have happened if the police had 
not intervened in an attempt to move Repent America farther away from the 
main stage.  In all likelihood, Repent America would have marched towards 
the stage, bullhorns in hand, and attempted to drown out and draw attention 
away from OutFest.  Violence could have also erupted.  Repent America’s 
goal, after all, was to bring the event to an end.  
V.  THE PROPOSAL: SIX STEPS FOR UNIVERSITIES 
One solution to the problem of the New Heckler’s Veto on university 
campuses is to apply Supreme Court precedent in the same manner as it was 
used in Startzell.  However, there are some important distinctions to make 
between university speakers and speakers at an event like OutFest.  This first 
is the venue itself.  OutFest took place outside on the streets of Philadelphia, 
while most campus speaker events are held indoors in either auditoriums or 
classrooms.  This is a practical distinction that frustrates Supreme Court 
precedent—the protestors must be allowed inside the venue.  A narrow 
definition of the venue would state that the protestors must be allowed inside 
the room where the speaker is presenting and be free to exercise their free 
speech rights.  However, this would not solve the problems of the New 
Heckler’s Veto, because they are indoors and in close proximity to the 
speaker, meaning that their voices can still drown out the speaker.  A better 
approach to defining the venue would be to view it more broadly, including 
an area close to but outside of the classroom or auditorium.  Therefore, their 
message is still given an ample opportunity to be heard, but not at the 
expense of the speaker’s message.  Of course, if protestors want to engage 
substantively with the discussion, they should be allowed into the room itself; 
it is only when they wish to shut down the event or drown out the speaker 
 
 106 Id. at 200. 
 107 Id. at 202. 
 108 Id. 
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that they should be required to leave the room. 
The next distinction is the security and who is responsible for providing 
it.  The police themselves cannot be expected to bear the burden of showing 
up to college events where protestors may get rowdy, and so private security 
is often hired to assist.  Placing the burden of paying for security on student 
groups would likely be unconstitutional, since “[s]peech cannot be financially 
burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it 
might offend a hostile mob.”109  Security is one of the most expensive 
elements of hosting a speaker, and many student groups will be unable to 
afford the fees.110  To have the university not provide security would place 
the group in a difficult position of trying to go on without security and getting 
shut down, or bankrupting the student group with security fees.  This would 
essentially operate as a tax on certain viewpoints, which would be 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  Luckily, most times universities 
will comply and pay for the security fees for the student group.111  With 
security present, the hosting group would have a valid enforcement 
mechanism to protect the speaker’s rights if the audience attempts to shut 
him down. 
With these distinctions in mind, it is possible that university campuses can 
prevent the New Heckler’s Veto from shutting down speakers on campuses.  
Because speech silencing expressive activities is not unlimited, “courts will 
allow the state to regulate hecklers in order to maintain an environment 
 
 109 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); see also Rosenberger v. Rector 
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (“[T]he government offends the First 
Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their 
expression.”) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 115 (1991))). 
 110 Security fees can range from $15,000 to upwards of $900,000, depending on the extent of the 
protests.  Megan Schellong, Here’s How Much Security Costs When an Incendiary Speaker Comes to Campus, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2017/09/13/heres-how-
much-security-costs-when-an-incendiary-speaker-comes-to-campus/. 
 111 See, e.g., Celine Ryan, UCLA Caves, Agrees to Pay for Security at Shapiro Event, CAMPUS REFORM (Nov. 
1, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.campusreform.org/?ID=10090 (reporting that UCLA agreed to 
pay for security costs for a speaker event after “being threatened with legal action”); Drew Van 
Voorhis, UMiami Agrees to Pay Security Fee for Charles Murray Talk After Pressure from Conservative Law 
Students, COLLEGE FIX (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.thecollegefix.com/post/42898/ (detailing 
University’s willingness to pay for security after receiving student group’s complaints about 
viewpoint neutrality); cf. Katherine Long, College Republicans Threaten to Sue UW Over $17,000 Security 
Fee for Saturday Rally, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/college-republicans-threaten-to-sue-uw-
over-17000-security-fee-for-saturday-rally/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2018, 5:52 PM) (reporting that a 
student group plans to sue the University of Washington after the University told the group that it 
had to pay for its own security fees). 
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where voices that cannot shout the loudest will still have an opportunity to 
be heard.”112  The task comes down to where the line must be drawn between 
the two competing interests, but it is often difficult to know in advance “when 
the expressive activities of certain private speakers interfere so substantially 
with the ability of other speakers to communicate that state regulation of 
speech is justified.”113  
In the case of universities, the six-step plan explained below is the best 
way to balance those interests and establishes where the line should be 
drawn.  This plan is not required by the First Amendment but is instead a 
permissible regulation of the protestors’ speech rights under the First 
Amendment.  First, universities should implement policies that prevent 
students from disrupting or shouting over any invited speaker, regardless of 
their political affiliation or their message.114  This regulation would be a 
content neutral regulation because it has nothing to do with the subject 
matter of the speech.  It would also be viewpoint neutral because it applies 
to everyone who wishes to disrupt speakers, and not just to those who wish 
to disrupt speakers with certain viewpoints.  Even if this has a greater impact 
on certain viewpoints, it will still likely be held to be content and viewpoint 
neutral.115  Second, universities should provide security to student groups 
who ask for it if they fear that there will be attempts to shut their speaker 
down.  As previously mentioned, providing security and requiring student 
groups to pay for it would be placing an impermissible burden on their 
speech.116  Providing the hosting student group with security would provide 
them with an enforcement mechanism so that they will no longer be helpless 
in front of a mob that attempts to take over their event.  In addition to the 
enforcement purpose of the security, the presence of security at an event will 
also serve as a deterrent, showing protestors that they will have a difficult 
time shutting down an event and may be stopped before they can achieve 
their desired result. 
Third, if the university is aware of a protest or of attempts to shut down 
a speaker, the university should set up a “protest zone” outside of the room 
where the speaker is talking.  This way both groups will be able to 
communicate their messages without directly conflicting with the other.  To 
 
 112 Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 538 (2003). 
 113 Id. at 538–39. 
 114 See Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 32 (“[T]hose who have been given access to the space for 
certain purposes have the right not to be disrupted in that activity.”).  
 115 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723–25 (2000) (upholding a statute that prohibited 
knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person near a health care facility without 
consent as content neutral, even though the statute particularly burdened one viewpoint of speech). 
 116 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 515 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992). 
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facilitate both groups, university officials can notify the community of both 
the event and the protest so as to prevent any confusion about where certain 
messages can be engaged substantively.  Fourth, protestors should be allowed 
inside the speaker room so long as they are not chanting or using large signs 
to block the view of spectators.  If the protestors want to substantively 
challenge the speaker on his views, the protestors should be encouraged to 
do so.  However, if chanting and attempts to shut down the speaker begin to 
occur, security will remove them from the event.  Fifth, security should 
prevent a large group of people from the “protest zone” from coming into 
the event all at the same time.  A group of that size can reasonably be believed 
to wish to shut down the speaker, and therefore the time, place, and manner 
restriction should take effect to prevent them from doing so.  Sixth, students 
who disrupt or attempt to disrupt the event should face disciplinary action.  
Without disciplinary action, the protestors will not recognize that shutting 
down opposing viewpoints is inappropriate, and there would be no 
disincentive to engage in such conduct.117  These policies will not only 
withstand a constitutional challenge, but also better promote the purpose of 
both the First Amendment and university—to promote discussion and 
discourse.118  Without discussion and discourse, students cannot discover the 
truth for themselves, and they would be better suited saving their tuition 
money and investing in some more books instead.  This does not mean, 
however, that these restrictions would not be challenged on First 
Amendment grounds. 
 
 
 
 117 See Zach Greenberg, Rejecting the “Heckler’s Veto,” FIRE (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklers-veto/ (“By giving the heckler power to veto 
disfavored speech, colleges teach students that drowning out, shouting down, and assaulting those 
expressing differing opinions is an acceptable response to speech that they find offensive.  
Rewarding the bottle thrower by punishing the speaker only leads to more bottle throwers—and 
fewer speakers.”). 
 118 See, e.g., Guidelines on Open Expression, UNIV. OF PA. OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, 
https://catalog.upenn.edu/pennbook/open-expression/ (last visited June 15, 2018) (providing a 
framework for freedom of expression on campus).  Penn’s Guidelines on Open Expression are an 
example of a university policy that takes into account the considerations listed in this paper.  See id. 
(“Individuals or groups violate these Guidelines if: [t]hey interfere unreasonably with the activities 
of other persons.  The time of day, size, noise level, and general tenor of a meeting, event or 
demonstration are factors that may be considered in determining whether conduct is reasonable.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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A.  Challenges to Content Neutral Regulations 
Just because a regulation is content neutral does not mean it is immune 
from challenges.  In McCullen v. Coakley, a content neutral regulation was 
struck down for not being narrowly tailored.119  In that case, the state enacted 
a statute which made it “a crime to knowingly stand on a ‘public way or 
sidewalk’ within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place, other than 
a hospital, where abortions are performed.”120  A group of individuals who 
were prevented from approaching women to dissuade them from having 
abortions challenged the statute as a violation of the First Amendment.121  
The Court found that the statute was content neutral and noted that 
promoting “public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed 
use of public sidewalks and roadways” were significant government interests, 
but found that the thirty-five feet “buffer zones impose serious burdens on 
[the protestors’] speech.”122  Four Justices, however, found that the law was 
not content neutral because it was “a blanket prohibition on the use of streets 
and sidewalks where speech on only one politically controversial topic is 
likely to occur[ ] and where that speech can most effectively be 
communicated.”123  
In the case of exclusion from campus events, protestors may argue that 
being excluded from the room is just like the protestors in McCullen being 
restricted from the entrances to abortion clinics.  This argument is unlikely 
to be persuasive on several grounds.  First, the buffer zone restriction was 
struck down because there was another way to promote the government’s 
interests without burdening more speech than necessary.  In the case of 
protestors at university speaking events, there is no narrower way to tailor 
the restriction.  Allowing protestors free reign over their movements and 
occupation of the speaker’s room would essentially be the same as if the 
protestors in McCullen were allowed to block the entrances to abortion 
clinics.124  The time, place, and manner restriction is enacted for the very 
 
 119 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537–39 (2014). 
 120 Id. at 2525. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 2535; see also Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding that a 75-yard security zone that prevented 
demonstrators assembling near a pier “does not leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication”). 
 123 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2543 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); accord id. at 2549 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  This disagreement among the Justices shows that even the Court is 
not unified in its definition of content neutrality, which may pose some difficulty in evaluating the 
content neutrality of my own proposal. 
 124 The Court in McCullen noted that part of the challenged act, which prohibited this sort of behavior, 
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purpose of preventing this kind of behavior.  Second, there are ample 
alternatives for campus speaker protestors to communicate their message.  
Having a set “protest zone” outside the event would actually help promote 
their message, rather than hinder it, because it provides a meeting area for 
protestors to engage with others and convince them of their viewpoints. 
In deciding whether a restriction on speech is narrowly tailored, the 
restriction cannot “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further the government’s legitimate interests.”125  In Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York, the Supreme Court was confronted with both 
floating and fixed buffer zones around abortion clinics that prevented 
abortion protestors from getting too close to the women entering the 
clinics.126  The Court struck down the floating buffer zones for burdening 
more speech than necessary because they prevented protestors “from 
communicating a message from a normal conversational distance or handing 
leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public 
sidewalks.”127  The Court recognized that the prohibition was overbroad, 
“both because of the type of speech that is restricted and the nature of the 
location.”128  The fixed buffer zones around doorways, driveways, and 
driveway entrances were upheld as “necessary to ensure that people and 
vehicles trying to enter or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots can 
do so” because “the record shows that protesters purposefully or effectively 
blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic doorways, 
from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and 
out of clinic parking lots.”129 
 In the context of university speaker protests, the “protest zones” 
discussed earlier are more analogous to the analysis of fixed buffer zones 
rather than that of floating buffer zones.  Unlike in Schenck, where the 
protestors had to get close to others to communicate their message through 
handing out literature, during university protests the protestors do not need 
to get close to others because their method of communication is primarily 
oral.  Nothing is getting in the way of them distributing literature outside of 
the venue, so that type of speech is not unnecessarily burdened.  The only 
 
was more narrowly tailored than the challenged provision.  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537 (majority 
opinion). 
 125 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the 
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a. significant government interest.”). 
 126 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997). 
 127 Id. at 377. 
 128 Id. (emphasis added). 
 129 Id. at 380. 
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speech that is burdened is oral speech inside the venue itself.  Restricting 
protestors to areas outside the venue does not burden more speech than 
necessary.  While this is a restriction on their speech, it is a necessary one 
supported by events that have already taken place.  At the Brennan event at 
the University of Pennsylvania, protestors were allowed into the event and 
escorted out when they attempted to disrupt the event, but still the event 
failed.130  Room control cannot be regained once the chanting begins, and 
the speakers show that they cannot control the audience.  Therefore, the 
establishment of protest zones and restricting speech inside the venue is 
necessary to defend a legitimate government interest, just like the fixed buffer 
zones in Schenck. 
The “protest zones” will leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication for speaker protestors.  In Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals heard a challenge to the Nebraska Funeral 
Picketing Law (“NFPL”), which “prohibits picketing within 500 feet of a 
cemetery, mortuary, or church from one hour prior through two hours 
following the commencement of a funeral.”131  The court upheld the law as 
content neutral, narrowly tailored, and one that left open ample alternative 
channels of communication for the Westboro Baptist Church.132   The Court 
stated that the Westboro Baptist Church members are “free to lawfully picket 
and protest throughout the remainder of the city” and “are free to 
disseminate their message and publicize their views by (1) going door-to-door 
to proselytize, (2) distributing literature through the mail, (3) contacting 
residents by telephone, (4) writing letters to the editors of newspapers, and (5) 
using social media and the internet.133 
Here, like in Phelps-Roper, there is nothing preventing speaker protestors 
from protesting throughout the remainder of the campus.  Thus, the 
protestors “retain great latitude to express any viewpoint or discuss any topic 
at nearly any location and nearly any time throughout the rest of the 
[campus], except [inside the venue itself].”134  Therefore, the restrictions 
discussed above provide ample alternative channels of communication for 
university speaker protestors to express their disapproval of the speaker’s 
views.  Whether protestors are willing to accept these alternative channels 
 
 130 Johnson, supra note 44. 
 131 Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 895–96. 
 134 Id. at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 
F.3d 678, 695 (8th Cir. 2012)).  This is especially crucial because the intended audience is the entire 
university. 
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has yet to be determined. 
B.  Arguments Against and Rebuttal 
As with any argument, there is an opposing view that should be engaged 
and discussed. 135  Some critics argue that there is no free speech crisis on 
university campuses at all and that attempts to regulate protests on campus 
are both unnecessary and harmful.136  For example, one critic asserts that the 
poll by Villasenor137 that stated over half of college students accepted the 
New Heckler’s Veto is flawed and that “[e]mpirical data suggests that free 
speech is alive and well on campus.”138  He points out that conservatives have 
“lost the battle of persuasion, and largely [been] swept from the campus 
environment” and the “rich marketplace of ideas.”139  He asserts that 
“[t]here is virtually no support for, or interest in these events at the schools 
being targeted” and that college students are “exposed to some of the most 
intellectually open environments that have ever existed in a human 
society.”140  This critic justifies the exclusion of certain ideas from campuses 
because they are “ideological position[s] with little rational basis.”141 
These assertions are characteristic of the very type of mindset that is 
incompatible with the First Amendment.  Excluding ideas from campuses 
based on their supposed merits is viewpoint discrimination.  If he believes the 
ideas of conservatives are unpersuasive, why then do opponents of the ideas 
need to resort to tactics in which they shout over speakers and chase them 
from campus?  Why not expose the flaws in their arguments?  According to 
Mill, “[w]rong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and 
 
 135 Additionally, it would not fit within the spirit of the Comment to not address the other side. 
 136 Research shows that it is only a handful of speakers that are affected by the New Heckler’s Veto.  
See Sanford J. Ungar, Campus Speech Protests Don’t Only Target Conservatives, and When They Do, It’s Often 
the Same Few Conservatives, Georgetown Free Speech Tracker Finds, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2018) 
https://medium.com/informed-and-engaged/campus-speech-protests-dont-only-target-
conservatives-though-they-frequently-target-the-same-few-bda3105ad347 (finding that most of the 
shout downs were for Milo Yiannopoulos, Ben Shapiro, Charles Murray, Ann Coulter, and 
Richard Spencer).  But the New Heckler’s Veto should be concerning to all because it is a tactic 
that could be employed to shut down any speaker, so long as a small, vocal group wants to do so.  
Just because something is not an epidemic now does not mean we should turn a blind eye to finding 
solutions to it. 
 137 See Villasenor, supra note 34. 
 138 Chris Ladd, There is No Free Speech Crisis on Campus, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 3:20 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/09/23/there-is-no-free-speech-crisis-on-
campus/#489b9a3728cb. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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argument”—but that can only happen if there is in fact argument and 
discussion.142  This critic does not respond to this, and asserts that the New 
Heckler’s Veto does not have a “chilling” effect on free speech.  He makes 
assumptions that there is an “atmosphere of open, fact-driven debate” on 
campuses, but this runs contrary to what is actually happening when ideas 
are shouted down rather than debated.143   
Another common criticism of regulating speech on campuses comes from 
those who assert the importance of counter-speech.  One such critic points 
out that “much of the social pressure that critics complain about is itself 
speech” and that denouncing someone as “racist” or a “white nationalist” 
are simply activists “exercising their own right to free expression.”144  He 
asserts that “[e]ven heckling, though rude and annoying, is a form of 
expression” and is protected speech.145  He does not deny that “all counter-
speech has a potential chilling effect” because “the implicit goal of all 
argument is, ultimately, to quash the opposing view” so that it “will become 
so discredited that it is effectively, although not officially, silenced.”146  He 
concludes by asserting that society “should accept the legitimacy of insults, 
shaming, demonizing, and even social ostracism” as forms of argument that 
“say something about the merits” of a campus speaker.147 
Although the article makes great points regarding the importance of 
counter-speech, it fails to adequately consider whether any restrictions 
should be imposed on counter-speech.  While this critic points out that 
“heckling that is so loud and continuous a speaker literally cannot be heard 
is little different from putting a hand over a speaker’s mouth and should be 
viewed as antithetical to the values [of] free speech,” he does not assert that 
anything should be done about it.148  He instead punts on the question of 
how to deal with situations in which hecklers silence speakers by shouting 
over them by stating that “Americans must determine what degree of 
pressure we think is acceptable.”149  Instead of waiting out the New Heckler’s 
Veto, universities must implement policies that impose time, place, and 
manner restrictions on protestors who seek to silence other speakers with the 
 
 142 MILL, supra note 63, at 21. 
 143 Ladd, supra note 138. 
 144 Thomas Healy, Who’s Afraid of Free Speech?, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/whos-afraid-of-free-speech/530094/. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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volume of their voices.150  Counter-protests play an important role in 
American society, but they should not be allowed to trump competing free 
speech interests through unruly heckling tactics.151 
CONCLUSION 
“If we don’t stop the epidemic of shout-downs now, chaos and civil 
conflict may follow someday soon.”152  To avoid a descent into chaos, 
universities must enact new policies that place content neutral time, place, 
and manner restrictions on the speech rights of event protestors who wish to 
shut down speaking events on campus.  The New Heckler’s Veto is appealing 
to protestors because it is an easy and readily available method of combating 
viewpoints that they disagree with.  It works in the short run but will have 
dire consequences in the long run as it becomes accepted by all groups across 
the political spectrum in retaliation for its past use.  As Justice Holmes put it, 
“[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression 
of opinions that we loathe.”153  Though we may despise certain speakers and 
their views, we should point out the flaws in the arguments, not coerce them 
into silence.  Universities must institute policies that ultimately provide 
respect for all viewpoints in order to revitalize discussion and debate on 
university campuses.  Perhaps without the policies, discussion on university 
 
 150 This is not to say that nothing is being done on campuses to balance the interests of protestors and 
school administrators, as there are speech codes implemented on campuses, seminars held on the 
topic of participating in and responding to protests, and literature on protests that is being 
distributed.  See, e.g., EDUC. L. ASS’N & NASPA RESEARCH & POL’Y INST., RESPONDING TO 
CAMPUS PROTESTS: A PRACTITIONER RESOURCE 5 (2014), 
http://www.nacua.org/docs/default-source/meetings/responding-to-campus-protests-legal-
links.pdf (“A well-crafted speech and assembly policy is a sturdy fulcrum upon which an institution 
of higher education can balance its educational needs and the speaker’s interests in expression.”); 
see also Kathleen Santora, CEO’s Corner, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. ATTORNEYS (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.nacua.org/news/nacuanews/ceo-corner/ceo-corner-101 (describing a two-part 
seminar that was hosted by the National Association of College and University Attorneys in August 
2017, which had 650 attendees for the first part and 424 attendees for the second part). 
 151 Although speech codes are one method of regulating protestors and student organizations, 
universities should be cautious against implementing overbroad speech codes that infringe on the 
First Amendment rights of students.  See FIRE, SPOTLIGHT ON SPEECH CODES 2017: THE STATE 
OF FREE SPEECH ON OUR NATION’S CAMPUSES 5–6 (2017), available at 
https://www.thefire.org/spotlight-on-speech-codes-2017/ (finding that 39.6 percent of 449 
colleges analyzed maintain policies that “clearly and substantially” infringe upon the free speech 
rights of students). 
 152 Stanley Kurtz, Pro-Trumpers Shout-Down Liberal Speakers at Whittier College, NAT’L REV.: THE CORNER 
(Oct. 13, 2017, 8:40 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/pro-trumpers-shout-down-
liberal-speakers-whittier-college/.  
 153 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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campuses will become “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”154 and will 
no longer embody the spirit of the American debate and discussion. 
 
 154 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651). 
